THE New Republic

Coup in Baghdad—
Our Policy in
The Middle East

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East Wind, West Wind

Harold C. Hinton on The Cold Front in China

Dumb Clucks and Rascals . . . *Gerald W. Johnson*

Market Notes on Art . . . . . *Frank Getlein*

Withdrawal in Dixie . . . . *Charles L. Black, Jr.*

A Conversation with Walter Reuther

"The great tragedy in America is not that the Russians are better than we are—they're doing better because they're trying and we aren't."

JULY 21, 1958

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Washington Wire

The Fading of Father

THE NATION created a father-image out of Eisenhower in 1952, dumped its responsibilities on him, and relaxed. The deep psychological shock of the Goldfine case is that father has been caught in the jam closet, not exactly kissing the nursemaid himself, but saying tut-tut to Sherman Adams.

The larger-than-life image of Eisenhower was created by the one-party press because the public demanded such an image. The public wanted to forget world problems, domestic sacrifices, wanted to shove most of its troubles off on father.

Disillusionment is a gloomy thing. After World War II, the public wanted to believe Russia was a democracy; demanded to be told that; wouldn't listen to reason. When the truth came out it blamed everybody but itself and swung to McCarthyism. We can never forgive facts for being facts.

Eisenhower's fault now is that he is not a god after all; he is an old man who finds it hard to make decisions, who can't keep pace with his work and must play golf to survive. As he said poignantly of Sherman Adams, "I need him." It doesn't seem to him that he is asking much—all he wants is to put his need for Adams ahead of the old Eisenhower campaign image of "houndstooth" morality. Well, he can't do this. Whether Adams stays or goes now, we guess, doesn't matter much. The god is human after all.

People say, "We're tired of this Goldfine business—it's obscuring the important things!" Few things are more important in American public life than the President's stature. Why must the White House always be gleaming white? That's an image, too. We live by images. Disillusionment with Eisenhower affects politics and world affairs. It runs deep at home; it makes people cynical. (They will probably find another image soon in Nixon, however; his big build-up should be accelerated now.) And all this furore over one Boston millionaire! Virgil wrote: "I fear the Greeks bearing gifts." Adams should change it.—*Timeo Goldfinos dona ferentes.*

Congressional Stampede

THIS IS THE PERIOD in the two-year session of Congress which the conscientious correspondent hates because things happen too fast to keep his audience informed. The eye can't follow it: it is the subliminal period at the end-of-session. Probably Congress will quit around August 15—in about five weeks. This is the hectic period for selfish, last-minute bills to be jammed through, for powerful lobbies to pull strings, for every vested interest to trade favors. Bills that fail to be passed now must wait another two years.

The average newspaper reader is quite unaware of this carefully organized scramble. But every politician in Washington knows about it. It is almost too late now to build up grass roots support for anything, to mobilize pressure to stop vicious grabs.

Legislative Scorecard

EISENHOWER'S three "imperatives" — reciprocal trade act extension, money for foreign aid, and Pentagon reorganization —are all first-rate measures and ought to be passed. But all three are in danger of stultifying amendments and Eisenhower's diminished prestige (particularly in his own party) makes it harder to fight off concessions. . . . Then there is labor legislation: this column thinks the Senate-passed Kennedy-Ives bill for trade union regulation is a good bill; it is doubtful if it will pass the House though, largely because the Chamber of Commerce and the NAM are fighting it —they want to have a meaner bill toward labor and an easier bill on employers. . . . There's still some hope for aid to education—that is for creating a lot of federal scholarships. It's got as far as passing a House committee. But this feeble answer to the Sputniks has already brought a message from Eisenhower saying the committee proposal is too lavish. If it gets through it will be cut. . . . The Senate slam-banged through a huge, last-minute, $2.5 billion housing bill; nobody knows its fate in the House. It's a valuable measure so far as one can judge. . . . A powerful farm-business coalition in the House is pushing a major tax relief bill to aid self-employed persons (farmers and city professions) and ignoring ordinary workers. Probably the Senate will stop this one. . . . The House has broadened and sent back to the Senate a security bill (S 1411) hung round with McCarthy loyalty tests and proposed evidence by secret informers to regulate all federal workers, whether in sensitive agencies or not. A few votes may decide this. . . . These give you an example of what has been going on in Congress.

Krock Translated

COLUMNIST ARTHUR KROCK says the Democratic "party leadership" is worried over this fall's prospective election landslide and the "party liability that huge Democratic majorities might impose . . . from rushing to the extreme Left in politics." He says "the restraints of the Southern bloc and of the non-Southern moderates" may not be able to prevent this, along with its "disorder and radicalism."

Will you translate this please, Miss Abercrombie?

Certainly, sir. Mr. Krock is a Southern conservative of the Byrd school. When he refers to the "extreme Left" he means somebody like Hubert Humphrey or Dick Neuberger. When he says the "party leadership" is disturbed he means he is disturbed. When he refers to "extremists and eager beavers from the Midlands and the West" I suppose he refers to ordinary people like you and me. In general what he is saying is that a big Democratic victory this fall will move the center of balance over to the city Democrats away from the segregationist South, and that he doesn't like it at all.

Thank you very much, Miss Abercrombie.

T.R.B.

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GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
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HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. Ruskin, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Alexander M. Bickel, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Gerald W. Johnson, James E. King, Jr., Donald Malcolm, Helen Hill Miller

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Correspondence

► *The Algerian Inquisition*

SIRS:

MR. WINNER'S review of *The Question* (June 30th) contains an implication which I do not wish to let stand. It is that the French began torturing and murdering in Algeria only after the beginning of the Algerian terrorist cam-

(Continued on page 23)

Living with Nasser

OUR "FIRM ALLIES" in the Middle East, on whom Secretary Dulles has so much counted and to whom so much was promised, are being scattered, as Colonel Nasser last February threatened they would be, "like dry leaves before the wind." The former Foreign Minister of Iraq, Fadhil al-Jamali, was not speaking idly when on June 11 he accused "Nasserism" of "activating mobs all over the Arab world." The "mobs" have prevailed in Iraq, and we have little doubt they will prevail shortly in neighboring Jordan. And they will prevail, let it be said, only in part because of Nasser. The *ancien regime* in Iraq had not very much to commend it to the Iraqis.

Moreover, the *coup d'etat* in Baghdad—about which we are not fully informed 12 hours after the event—is no novelty in Iraqi history. An anti-Western spirit has long been strong in Iraq, expressing itself in a series of revolts in the 30's. Now, having been suppressed for the past 20 years, anti-Westernism may be expected to show itself all the more strongly. The Iraqi revolution of 1935 had much the same characteristics as the present one: it was a military revolt by left-wing officers who were nationalists, progressive in Iraqi terms, and democratically-minded when they first seized power. Then, as now, it was the crack Baghdad division of the Iraqi Army which overthrew the regime. In time, its leadership turned Fascist—that being the magnetic pole of totalitarianism in that day. It is an unpromising history. Of all the Arab countries, as Walter Z. Laqueur wrote more than three years ago in his book on *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East,*

> Iraq arouses the strongest feeling of pessimism. . . . The Iraqi regime has been one of scarcely veiled dictatorship and wholly reactionary in its outlook. . . . As a result, the government has antagonized most of the population, including the entire middle class, which is now willing to make common cause with the Communist fronts in order to overthrow the hated autocracy. . . . Even the best arms in the world are of no avail if the soldiers refuse to obey.

What should one anticipate from here on out? The logic of events points to the annexation by Iraq of the rich oil-producing principality of Kuwait. And this, on top of the possibility of nationalization in Iraq itself, will be of concern to oil-hungry Western Europe in general and to Great Britain in particular. Kuwait has been the largest single provider of new capital to the London money market—the cumulative total in oil capital from Kuwait since 1950 will reach a billion dollars before the year is out. If an investment of this magnitude should be lost to London, the financial situation in Britain will become precarious indeed.

It likewise appears certain that Iraq will now formally withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. The US serves on the military committee of the Pact. But from the start, as we have pointed out, the Pact's deterrent value has been minimized insofar as it has provided a pretext for Soviet involvement in the Middle East. It seems probable too that Iraqi-Egyptian-Syrian

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WHO ARE THE HOPEFULS?

In the weeks between Labor Day and Election Day *The New Republic* will present a series of special reports on political newcomers who are running this year for the House, Senate and Governorships.

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pressures will force the capitulation of King Hussein of Jordan and will accelerate the departure of President Chamoun in the struggle between Lebanese factions. What Washington, London, and Paris would do *(and militarily could do)* should Hussein request their military assistance under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 is an embarrassing question. Our guess is that we shall find it in the national interest to do very little—notwithstanding any effort we make to disguise our unwillingness to go to war by recourse to discussions in the UN.

Above all, what we see ahead is a massive shift in Middle East policy in the direction of the appeasement of Nasser. If this were 1955 and not 1958, we would call this shift a positive "adjustment" to the reality of Arab nationalism, but at this late date, Nasser's will be the positive policy and ours the response. We are not naïve about the risks in a policy which begins by assuming the inevitability of Nasserism in the Middle East. For Colonel Nasser is bound to continue his Pan-Arab foreign policy. Yesterday it was Lebanon, today it is Iraq, tomorrow he will clash with Jordan, or Sudan and Tunisia, or Israel and Turkey. He is impelled to expand because he cannot solve his internal social and economic problems. Not because of unwillingness or incompetence to tackle them: he is the most efficient ruler Egypt has had for centuries, and in his way, perhaps also the most patriotic. But the situation in Egypt being what it is—the lack of land and natural resources and the "population explosion"—it is doubtless whether even one as ruthless and smart as Stalin could succeed. Egypt's difficulties can be solved only in a wider framework—a greater Arab empire or Egyptian co-prosperity sphere. This is what Nasser tries to create, and everywhere it brings him into conflict with the West.

To the West, he is a problem also because behind his superficial cleverness, there is—as in so many other Arab politicians—a limited comprehension of the larger trends in world politics. The Arab National movement in its present form is a temporary alliance of basically incompatible groups. The cooperation between Nasser and the Communists will not last forever. But what presently goes on in the United Arab Republic is a popular front on a gigantic scale; public opinion is systematically indoctrinated to regard the Soviet Union as a true friend in every way, and the West as the enemy. Communists and their friends are taking over key positions in every field. If the break between Nasser and the Communists should occur tomorrow, he might yet prevail over his rivals. But in two or three years his chances to steer an independent course will be another matter. History may then repeat itself, and we may witness the unexpected spectacle of Nasser asking Washington for assistance in the Egyptian "civil war," followed by Moscow's stern warning that any Western intervention . . . and so on.

But such a development, however possible, may be years off. Meanwhile President Nasser—and no doubt the new rulers of Iraq—is absolutely certain that he has the Communists in his pocket, that he is master in his house. He promises to give little help to those who may wish to help him prevent his "positive neutrality" from becoming "positive pro-Communism"—if those who would help him also are unwilling to accede to the surrender of Israel!

The Russians certainly do not want a conflict with Nasser this year—not before their own cadres are ready to take over in Cairo. And so for the time being, Nasser will continue looking for his salvation in an "active foreign policy" that in fact increases his dependence on the East. The question is whether the US will assess accurately the self-interest of the various Arab states and provide alternatives to dependence on the East. It will be a tricky operation for the West to keep Nasser and his present friends from pursuing the fate that overtook Benes in Czechoslovakia in 1948. But we must try to do that, because there is nothing else we can do.

What Recession?

WHAT EVER happened to the recession? Lots of people have no jobs, steel mills operate languidly, and Detroit makes so few cars that nobody seems to care whether a new contract between the companies and the UAW is signed or not. But our newspapers have decided that the recession makes stale (or is it unpatriotic?) copy. The *new* news is that of economic improvement. Thus, on July 9, the *New York Times*, in a front page headline, pointed to the NEW JOB UPTURN SHOWN FOR JUNE. A more discreet subhead read: "But the total of unemployed reached a 17-year high." On June 29, a solemn editorial assured us that the rise in the cost of living was the smallest since December. The July 6 *Times* headlined the news that the recession was ending, and, lower and littler, that " . . . most experts expect slow recovery." Good news demands block letters. Bad news is fit to print in small type.

Have the *Times* and a large part of the rest of the press wished the country into prosperity? Unfortunately not, but the press has done something else instead. It has reinterpreted the recession in something like the following manner: True, we have close to 5.5 million per-

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sons unemployed, but many prophets expected 6 million out of work. Prices don't stop rising, but note how slowly they ascend. Maybe the recession isn't getting better, but it's wonderful that it grows no worse.

How soon can the economy absorb its idle men and idle plants? The 1959 automobiles, the hope of the optimist, promise to be less salable than their 1958 predecessors. Capital expenditures show few signs of reviving. Unemployment compensation has run out for hundreds of thousands, and supplementary unemployment compensation covered only a small fraction of manufacturing employees. In short, the fact that the press doesn't scream, doesn't prove that its readers aren't bleeding.

Brassie, Putter, Nine Iron

WHEN THE Canadian premier, Mr. John Diefenbaker, answered a parliamentarian—who inquired if the secret service man who accompanied President Eisenhower had entered the House armed—by saying that he thought the President came armed only with a brassie and a putter, he summarized one part of the recent exchange of views in Ottawa. Announcement of the new, Cabinet-level committee to direct Canadian-US defense policies for North America was clearly a brassie shot, long-range and straight for the flag. And most of the rest could have been done with a putter.

What is not known at this writing is the extent to which the President and Mr. Diefenbaker may have consulted about each other's recessions. If such talk did take place, Mr. Diefenbaker may well have had something to say about the uses of a Nine Iron when the economy lodges in a sand trap. The Canadians have used a much heavier club than we in an effort to lift their economy back onto the fairway. Canada's decline in production started earlier, but it has not gone nearly as deep as that of the US: its drop, from the high of February, 1957, to the low of last December was a 7 percent fall-off, compared with a US contraction of 13 percent from August, 1957, to April of this year.

Canadian programs have included a price floor for farmers, direct public investment expenditures, aid to provinces and municipalities for public works. On the consumer side, social security payments have been increased as have direct loans for housing which have produced a record number of starts.

Privileged Snoopers

"JACK ANDERSON was, of course, imprudent, but I need him," was Drew Pearson's remark when his assistant was caught eavesdropping on Bernard Goldfine's public relations man. Mr. Pearson could afford to be flippant: the incident was good for his business; the only one who got hurt was the House Committee's investigator, Baron Shacklette, who let himself be led out on a Pearson limb and was cut off and out of a job after almost 20 years of government service.

Furthermore, Jack Anderson can argue that he broke no federal statute by eavesdropping. There would be a legal question on the admissibility of the evidence obtained if the police were so engaged, but Anderson and Shacklette, if they are subject to any legal reprisal at all, are liable only to civil action for committing a minor wrong through a violation of privacy. They might also say there's no cause for moral outrage at their doing a little "bugging" (it has been done by others, and is not against the law), since the country comparatively calmly accepted the announcement on May 18 of its chief crime detector, J. Edgar Hoover, that he is currently tapping 90 telephone wires, thus openly admitting 90 separate violations of federal law.

But who doubts that if FBI men had been caught doing what Anderson was encouraging a Congressional investigator to do in this instance, Drew Pearson would have been among the first to denounce Hoover's "snoopers." Is Anderson's snooping any more defensible because he was purportedly aiding in the detection of interference with a Congressional investigation? And if "bugging" is an admissable technique of news-gathering, how about a spot of bribery (it's just a favor for a favor), or even blackmail?

"There are things worse," Senator Morse observed some weeks back, "than not being able to get the facts."

The Court and Congress

WHEN ADJOURNMENT fever comes to Congress, as it does every year, many bills that should live, die. And, curiously and more regrettably, some live that shouldn't, though earlier in the session they seemed on their way to a deserved grave. This latter evil is particularly acute this year in respect to a rash of proposed legislation, aimed, in a phrase coined some three years ago by the Honorable James F. Byrnes, at "curbing the Supreme Court"—which is to say, further curbing individual rights in the name of "national security."

The latest of these bills, pliantly offered by the Administration, would grant the State Department very considerable authority to restrict travel. Only the other day the Supreme Court held that the Department cannot exercise such powers on its own. Another bill would permit dismissal on security grounds of federal employees who haven't the remotest connection with national security: janitors, charwomen and the like. Security dismissals have been restricted to "sensitive" positions since the Court's decision of the Cole case in 1956. Other proposals before the Congress touch, with singular lack of wisdom,

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on procedures to be followed at Congressional investigations, traditional safeguards to the questioning of suspects by federal police officials, enforcement of the Smith Act, and more.

In its decisions at which these bills are directed, the Supreme Court did not invoke constitutional prohibition. It invited Congressional reconsideration, pointed up certain values for Congress to give new weight to, and read Congress a lesson on the explicitness, the clarity, and the deliberation that, in Holmes' words, are not merely a duty but a necessity when important legislation is enacted. But in the end, as this journal has noted, the Court threw the ball back to Congress. However, the reluctance of the Court to render a constitutional decision, and to return an issue to Congress, is certainly not to give the legislature license to act foolishly. Nor is it to say that constitutional issues may not yet be reached. If Congress now, in the grip of adjournment fever, acts, as the President might say, imprudently, the effect will be to bring before the Court the constitutional questions that were recently avoided, and very likely to bring them there in the worst possible way from the point of view of men like Reps. Walter and Keating who are pushing these bills.

Unfortunately we cannot take comfort in the prospect of this ironic confrontation in the courts, because laws can do much harm before they are declared unconstitutional, and they leave scars afterwards. And because in the longer view, foolishness in the legislature, no matter if counteracted by the court, must needs sap the strength of democratic government.

Hoffa's Comeback

THE SAME 20th Century technology and organization which have made possible Walter Reuther's brand of big unionism are enabling a very different sort of man, James R. Hoffa, to multiply power for different objectives. Mr. Hoffa's "transportation unity" pact with Maritime leader Joseph Curran and Captain Bradley of the Longshoremen is short of being the stranglehold on our distributive economy which some fear; but it is, to be sure, a dramatic reminder of how little Hoffa was hurt by the Teamsters' expulsion from the AFL-CIO.

The alliance with Curran rests on Curran's rivalry with a former AFL Seafarers' union for the dock hands and merchant seamen who will work in the Great Lakes when the St. Lawrence Seaway opens next year. Thus, it is not clear whether Hoffa is using Curran or Curran is temporarily using Hoffa. But Curran or no Curran, Hoffa is turning up here, there and everywhere in the AFL-CIO. He has already established mutual aid pacts with six unions outside the transport field—the Machinists (whose president, Al Hayes, is chairman of the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Committee), Butchers, Upholsterers, Carpenters, Hod Carriers, and Operating Engineers. He is helping the Office Workers to organize white collar employees. He provided a well-timed strike threat to help the Retail Clerks win a recent contract from Montgomery Ward (the Clerks, in turn, will help the Teamsters organize 200,000 Sears, Roebuck employees). At Hoffa's invitation the Teamsters and Brewery Workers are negotiating an end to a feud dating back to turn-of-the-century beer wagon days.

When the AFL-CIO Executive Council considers at its August 18 meeting whether to impose penalties on affiliates for dealing with the expelled Teamsters, those passing judgment will include not only Al Hayes, but two Council Vice Presidents who are also presidents of the Brewery Workers and the Retail Clerks. Whatever the Council decides, the Hoffa problem will get worse before—if ever—it gets better.

The Crowded Planet

> In 600 years the number of human beings will be such that there will be only one square meter for each to live on. The one square meter would include Arctic waters, deserts and mountain tops. It goes without saying that this can never take place; something will happen to prevent it.

WHAT THAT "something" is, is left to the imagination of one who reads the UN's study on "The Future Growth of World Population," just published by the Population Branch of the UN Bureau of Social Affairs.

It took 200,000 years for the world's population to reach 25,000 million; but it will take only another 30 years to add another 2,000 million. Less than 100 years ago, in 1860, there were about 1,250 million inhabitants of the earth; the 1958 total is twice that, and by the year 2000 it may be doubled or nearly tripled. While early in this century there was one European for every two Asians, by 2000 the ratio may have become one to four. And—most cheerless prospect of all—population is growing most rapidly in the less-developed regions, where high mortality rates have declined markedly—infant mortality rates in particular having dropped so that a larger proportion of the population is living to the age of reproduction.

The pressure of more people will be eased, one anticipates, by the tapping of presently unused resources—vegetable substances of the seas, or solar and atomic energies. Assuming, however, that the fertility of the human race is not profoundly damaged by a heavy increase in radiation, and that the next 40 years are got through without general war, the conclusion is inescapable that planned prevention of births will be mandatory in regions where population increase far outstrips other forms of productivity, and that birth-control education recently begun in countries such as India and China must become more widespread.

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Report From Algeria—*De Gaulle's Gamble*

Algiers

WHAT BETTER SYMBOLIZES the strange interregnum that Algeria has now entered than the present condition of the Government Building in Algiers? Viewed from the outside—which is to say, 300 feet above the blue floor of the Mediterranean—no edifice could appear more serenely detached from the bustling metropolis beneath it. Its nine tiers of balconies and awninged windows appear as clean and ultra-modern as an Alpine sanatorium, and even the khaki-shirted sentinels that guard its glass doors with tommy-guns seem as inoffensively efficient as hospital attendants.

Behind this Olympian façade, however, all is improvisation and confusion. On every floor are relics of the May 13 jamboree—chairs, tables, desks, and cabinet files—pushed hastily into the corners of landings or corridors, while grunting Moslems move cases loaded with office equipment into half-empty offices. On the ground floor, where the library is situated, a team of unhappy employees laboriously pulls wrinkled and dirtied documents from huge sacks into which they were hastily thrown for safe-keeping. Officers and civilians in open shirts wander all over the building in search of offices that seem to have disappeared.

The first day I penetrated this bureaucratic labyrinth I found myself on a landing in the midst of a score of expectant loungers whom I took to be journalists. Before I could find out just what it was they were waiting for an energetic young man with a crew cut bustled up, shook hands with everyone, and said: *"Suivez-moi."* After opening and closing several doors he led us into a kind of class-room, filled with a few wooden chairs and two long tables, where I found myself attending a meeting of local union representatives, convened by a member of the Algiers Committee of Public Safety to consider a petition to General Salan!

Though no exact count has yet been made, the number of Committees of Public Safety that have sprung up in the last two months runs into the hundreds. In Algiers alone, there is the Committee of Public Safety for Algeria and the Sahara, headed by General Massu and a Moslem, Sid Cara. There is the Committee of Public Safety for the city of Algiers, headed by Colonel Godard, the director of Algeria's Security division. There is a Committee of Public Safety for the Taxi Drivers; another for the Port of Algiers; and an enterprising widow, Madame Charles Vallin, has set one up among the students of Algiers' Cité Universitaire.

But in a militarized country like Algeria, where the army has now virtually absorbed all administrative functions, these Committees are about as much of a potential threat as cheer-leaders at a ball-game. As a sanguine Algerian Frenchman said to me: "In 1793, when Robespierre headed a Committee of Public Safety of nine men, that was a serious matter. They possessed powers of life and death. But what can you expect from scores of committees of from anywhere from a dozen to 60 members? *Ce n'est pas serieux, tout ca.*" Indeed, a good many officers would probably not mind seeing the Committees done away with entirely. Even General Massu was recently overheard grumbling, while trying to push his way to his office through a milling group of local vigilantes: *"J'en ai marre de ce cirque FFI."* ("I'm fed up with this FFI circus"—the FFI referring to the Forces Françaises de l'Interieur, or resistance men who climbed on to the Liberation band-wagon in 1944.)

While the Army is in absolute control in Algeria, it is subject to a spirit of wartime enervation which makes it naturally sympathetic to the ceaseless propaganda put out by the local settlers. The Army's Information Section, now run by officers from the Psychological Warfare Bureau, feels that winning a war demands a martial spirit, whether on the firing-line or in the rear. There is thus established a peculiar climate of opinion in which only the "orthodox" truth is allowed immediate diffusion. The best example of this is the endlessly repeated contention that Algeria is an integral part of France. The other day, while seated on the sidewalk of an Algiers cafe, I was treated to a 15-minute outpouring of this kind of propaganda. The high-point was reached after a tremulous roll of drums when a deep voice solemnly announced: *"La Seine traverse Paris comme la Mediterranée traverse la France!"*

ANOTHER EXAMPLE is the poster which is everywhere seen on walls, pillars and shop windows, and which proclaims in letters arranged in the form of a Cross of Lorraine superimposed on a background of "fraternizing" Moslems and Europeans: "55 Millions de Français . . . from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset"—that is, from the Northernmost tip of France to the capital of the Hoggar, in the Southern Sahara. Perhaps the greatest merit General de Gaulle displayed during his recent 3-day trip to Algeria was his impatience with this kind of rhetorical smoke-screen. "Enough of words and phrases," he would say to his entourage, "they are too easy. What are needed are deeds."

CURTIS CATE

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The Superficial Aspect

Dumb Clucks and Rascals

THERE IS a verse in the Bible that used to puzzle me greatly. It is in the eighteenth chapter of the First Book of the Kings, where it is related that Elijah the Tishbite having made a weather forecast of the end of the current drought, called a conference at the summit of Mount Carmel and there saw his prophecy fulfilled. But how it was fulfilled! Fire plunged from heaven and consumed not only the sacrifice drenched with 12 barrels of water, but even the stones of the altar on which it lay. The priests of Baal were liquidated on the spot to the number of 850. A cloud no bigger than a man's hand suddenly loomed over the whole sky and the King, aghast, leaped into his whirly-bird and hastily took off for Gettysburg or the equivalent thereof. Then comes the verse that long astonished me, ending the narrative and the chapter with these words:

> And the hand of the Lord was on Elijah; and he girded up his loins, and ran before Ahab to the entrance of Jezreel.

Even as a child in Sunday School I could understand what impelled the King to scram out of there, but why did the prophet out-run the chariot? He had foretold the event, and they had razzed him unmercifully—called him a prophet of doom and gloom. Then when things turned out as he had predicted it seemed to me that he should have been blandly complacent, rather than scared into breaking the sound barrier.

But I begin to understand now. A few days ago while looking through the files I came across a sentence published in this place on May 23, 1955. It read: "Judging by its first 27 months, the epitaph of the Eisenhower Administration may be, 'It lacked mentality'." The quotation was what a Republican Senator had said about Warren G. Harding in 1920.

Now I am no professional prophet, not even a good amateur, merely a dub; but today I know that when one's prophecy turns out to be not merely right, but too right, too godawfully right, the prophet's dominant emotion is not complacence but a powerful yen to get off the premises as if jet-propelled. No wonder Elijah bolted!

He had one advantage over me. There is sound of abundance of rain, and I would fain take cover, but I have not the faintest idea in which direction lies Jezreel. In fact, I don't think there is any Jezreel, for we are stuck with this Administration until January, 1961, and that is a long time to endure lack of mentality in high places. For a very superficial study of history is enough to show that the state rarely, if ever, suffers as much damage from the depredations of a brainy rascal as it does from the dumb cluck who stupidly repeats the errors of his predecessor, even though he may be, morally, no worse than the average politician.

It is the dull repetition of previously exposed folly that is the most ominous sign at the moment. Lebanon, Little Rock and Castro the bandit have been fumbled, heaven knows, but they are, in some respects, new problems. Truman, Acheson and Forrestal left no blue-prints for dealing with them, and the worst that can be said of Administration policy in these matters is that it lacks ingenuity.

By the same token, if present-day delators were charging certain lackeys of the Administration with barratry, ecclesioclasm, defenestration and other malversations of an arcane and extraordinary quality, one might say that the rogues at least are ingenious. But when they repeat the exact stupidities that they were lately deriding in their predecessors, even that cold comfort is denied us.

When Jenner, Bricker, Knowland and others asserted, as if it were an accusation, that the Eisenhower Administration had borrowed its ideas from the New Deal, they were talking through their hats. If an idea is a good one, a man of sense takes it over, regardless of its origin. But now that it is apparent that some understrappers of this Administration have borrowed from some understrappers of the Truman Administration their snide and slippery procedures, the charge that the present regime has no ideas of its own gains weight.

FIRST-RATE statecraft ought to be copied, as there is usually nothing better available. But to copy methods of chiseling whose stupidity has just been exposed argues a barrenness of imagination that is beyond description.

This terrific fulfillment has jarred the prophet of 1955 loose from any feeling of complacence and filled him with an impulse to take to his heels, if he only had an idea which way to run. But with flight impossible, we can only brace ourselves to sweat it out. After all, Lady Luck may still be with us. Perhaps the recession has already touched bottom. Perhaps the Middle East will not take fire from Iraq. Perhaps Castro has by now recovered his senses. Perhaps despair will not drive the Arkansas Negroes into disastrous folly. But our hope is in the mysterious ways of Providence, not in the mentality of King Ahab's court.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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East Wind, West Wind

IN THE OPINION of Mao Tse-tung, the East wind has prevailed over the West wind. This may or may not be true in the sense that he intended, that the balance of world power has tipped in favor of the "socialist camp," but it is certainly true in another sense. Whereas at one time, especially in 1956, Communist China exerted a generally liberalizing influence on the domestic policies and mutual relations of the European Communist states, including the Soviet Union, its influence is now of the opposite kind. It is a chill wind that now blows across Eastern Europe from Peking, bringing with it a general tendency toward rigidity, increased emphasis on Soviet leadership, renewed conflict with Tito, and quite possibly a Communist attack against Taiwan.

by HAROLD C. HINTON

THE COMMUNIST PARTY of China (CPC) has constantly acknowledged Soviet leadership of the Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement and has modestly refrained, not only from challenging Soviet leadership, but even from attempting to put itself on a par with the Soviet party as a co-leader of the bloc. On the other hand, the Chinese party has also held that *no* party, even the Soviet party, has the right to dominate the internal affairs of another. Liu Shao-chi, China's second-ranking Communist, made this clear in his commentary on the Stalin-Tito controversy, *On Internationalism and Nationalism*, published in November, 1948. In this work Liu returned to the Leninist view of the proper relationship among Communist Parties, whether in or out of power, by labeling it with the phrase "free federation" (a phrase which was deleted from subsequent editions published both in the Soviet Union and in China).

This ambivalence—unity of the Soviet bloc as against autonomy for various Communist Parties—was clearly evident in the first public reaction of the Chinese Communists to Khrushchev's attack on Stalin—an editorial published in the *People's Daily* on April 5, 1956. While admitting Stalin's excesses and agreeing that a certain amount of "de-Stalinization" in the domestic policies of Communist Parties was desirable, the article insisted on the other hand that Stalin's merits outweighed his defects and explained the latter as an outgrowth of the "contradictions" which it felt must exist even in a "socialist" society (a concept apparently unacceptable to Khrushchev). Among Stalin's achievements the article listed the three things which form the core of Stalin's formula for "building socialism in one country": the totalitarian police state, the collectivization of agriculture, and the overwhelming emphasis on heavy and strategic industry. The article furthermore seemed to be warning Khrushchev by implication that in denouncing Stalin he had opened a Pandora's box which he might find it hard to shut again.

Whether or not the Polish delegation to the Chinese Communist Party's Eighth Congress in September of '56 received any direct encouragement from Chinese leaders to take a more independent stand toward the Soviet Union, the Poles certainly liked what they saw: a Communist Party "building socialism" without accepting Soviet dictation and in its own way, which differed in certain non-essential respects from the Russian way, while remaining a loyal and integral part of the Soviet bloc. The Poles evidently decided to go and do likewise, and in this they had Peking's approval. It is quite possible that about October 20, 1956, when it looked for a time very much as though Khrushchev intended to crush the Poles as he did the Hungarians two weeks later, the Chinese intervened behind the scenes to prevent the extinction of a movement for which they were at least partly and indirectly responsible. To Peking, the essential point was that, for all their rebelliousness, the

HAROLD C. HINTON *is a scholar and writer who specializes in Far Eastern affairs and Chinese Communism.*

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Poles were not trying to break with the Soviet bloc.

Under overwhelming popular pressure, Imre Nagy soon took the step which the Poles had prudently refrained from taking and on November 1 announced that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and thereby from the Soviet bloc. Immediately Peking, which had been at least benevolently neutral toward him until then, turned sharply against him and gave full outward support to the bloody Soviet intervention. In their heart of hearts, the Chinese undoubtedly regretted the Soviet action but regarded it as the lesser of two evils, the greater being the loss of Hungary to the Soviet bloc. When Tito in his Pula speech of November 11, sharply criticized the Soviet intervention and washed some other Communist dirty linen in public, his remarks were a serious shock to the Chinese. The warm wind from Peking ceased to blow and was replaced by a cold one.

On December 29, 1956, the *People's Daily* published a long article addressed to Tito, but in reality to the entire Communist world. It attempted to exorcise the troublesome ghost of Stalin by giving a definitive analysis of his merits and defects, the former again being said to have outweighed the latter. It was successful in this, for there has been very little public discussion of the Stalin question in Communist circles since that time. The article also addressed itself to an even more important topic, that of the proper relationship among Communist Parties. The theme was: We must hang together, or we will hang separately. The relationship must be marked neither by "big nation chauvinism" (such as Stalin had displayed) nor by "little nation chauvinism" (such as Tito was thought to have manifested in his criticisms of the Soviet Union). "The Communist Parties must seek unity with each other as well as maintain their respective independence." Why should the Soviet Union lead the Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement? Because,

> during these past 39 years the Soviet Union has been the center of the international Communist movement, owing to the fact that it is the first triumphant socialist country, the most powerful and experienced country in the socialist camp since its emergence, capable of giving the most significant help to other socialist countries and to the peoples of various countries in the capitalist world. . . .

In its anxiety to reinforce the Soviet position, the article went further than this. Apparently repudiating the concept of "variant paths to socialism," which the Soviet party had endorsed as recently as February, 1956, at its Twentieth Congress, the Chinese article insisted that the "path of the October Revolution" (in other words, the way in which the Soviet party was said to have seized power and then to have exercised it) was universally applicable, variations from it being permissible but only in details. The CPC thus seemed to be abandoning, at least for the record, the claim which it had loudly voiced from 1949 to 1951, that its own way to power, rather than the Russian, was applicable to the underdeveloped countries of the world.

In January, 1957, the impact of this article was reenforced by Chou En-lai, who spent 10 days in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe upholding the Soviet position as against that of other parties, especially the Poles.

There can be little doubt that Peking's prestige in Eastern Europe, which had stood very high until then, suffered from this change of course. It rose again, for a time, when Mao Tse-tung at the end of February, 1957, justified an invitation to freer public debate in Communist China on the Leninist ground that "contradictions" (*i.e.*, differences of opinion and conflicts of interest capable of being resolved through compromise) in a "socialist" society are not only inevitable but legitimate. But Mao's invitation backfired when unexpectedly strong criticisms of the CPC voiced in May led the party to strike back at its critics in June, in the so-called "anti-rightist struggle." "De-Stalinization" in Communist China seemed to be going into reverse.

Thus, in early November of last year, when the Communist and "Workers' " Parties of the Soviet bloc gathered in solemn conclave at Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mao Tse-tung stood forward even more prominently than Khrushchev as the champion of Soviet leadership of the Soviet bloc and the universal applicability of the "path of the October Revolution." According to an account by a Politburo member of the East German Socialist Unity Party, published in *Neues Deutschland* on November 30, 1957,

> Comrade Mao Tse-tung was the first to speak on the draft of the Declaration worked out jointly by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. . . . He said that like every small party group, we too must have a leader. The Communist Party of China is "not deserving" of this role. It is true that China has much experience in revolution, but only a little experience in socialist construction. . . . But above all, the Soviet Union has 40 years of experience. Without the Soviet Union all of us would have been conquered by other countries. . . . From all this stems the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the community of Communist and Workers Parties and the leading role of the Soviet Union at the head of the states in the socialist camp.

The refusal of the Yugoslavs to adhere to the conference's so-called Twelve Party Declaration, which included the statement that "revisionism" (*i.e.*, a tampering with the essentials of Marxism-Leninism) was more of a danger to the world Communist movement than was "dogmatism" (*i.e.*, Stalinism), aroused little public comment at the time. The refusal made it clear, however, that Tito had no intention of resuming full membership

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in the Soviet bloc on the latter's terms. Nor was much said at first about the draft program, decidedly unorthodox by Marxist-Leninist standards, that was adopted by the League of Yugoslav Communists at its Seventh Congress, which convened on April 21, 1958. Yet despite the severe criticisms of the Soviet Union, some of them reminiscent of Tito's Pula speech, which Tito himself and other Yugoslav speakers voiced at the congress, Mme. Furtseva in Moscow took pains to say that the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture of 1948 would not be repeated.

But if Moscow, or at least Khrushchev's dominant faction within the Soviet party, was disposed to swallow the insults emanating from Belgrade, the same could not be said of Peking! Last May 5, on the 140th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx and the date of the opening of the second session of the CPC's Eighth Congress, the *People's Daily* published an editorial attacking the "revisionism" embodied in the Yugoslav party's program. It denounced the Yugoslavs for espousing evolution rather than revolution and for holding the Soviet bloc at least partly responsible for the Cold War. It endorsed as "basically correct" the Cominform's resolution of June, 1948, expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform, although it termed "incorrect" the resolution of November, 1949, urging Tito's overthrow.

WHETHER or not it had given advance notice of its intention to the other parties, the fact remains that the CPC had taken the lead in forcing the issue with the Yugoslavs. The other parties, beginning with those of North Korea and the Soviet Union, promptly took up the hue and cry; *Pravda* reprinted and endorsed the *People's Daily's* editorial on May 6. On May 9 the Soviet party's Central Committee formally warned the Yugoslavs to give up their "revisionism." The Chinese denunciation of Marshal Tito seems to have given a handle to Khrushchev's Stalinist opponents in the Kremlin with which to force him into a more aggressive course than he probably would have liked. Soon afterward he tried to keep the door to reconciliation open by sending birthday greetings to Tito. Mme. Furtseva made a public reference to the thirteen "socialist" countries, a figure which can be arrived at only by including Yugoslavia in the Soviet bloc. The Chinese, for their part, seem to have been unpleasantly surprised that their attack on Tito had reacted against Khrushchev, whose domestic and foreign policies Mao Tse-tung had emphatically and publicly endorsed at Moscow in the previous November. On May 12 Chen Yi, Communist China's new Foreign Minister and long-time Vice Premier, gave an interview to some West German reporters in which he made the comparatively conciliatory statement that "Yugoslavia has the right to maintain its own standpoint. We have the right to criticize." He also said that Communist China would one day have nuclear weapons.

On May 20 a meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, a Soviet-dominated organization of East European countries, opened in Moscow with a delegation of high-ranking Chinese Communists in attendance as observers. The next day it was announced in Peking that Communist China hoped to send up its own earth satellite shortly. On May 26, the day after the adjournment of the CEMA meeting, Khrushchev held talks with the Chinese observers. The senior observer, Vice Premier Chen Yun, the fifth-ranking member of the CPC and a specialist in economic affairs, addressed a meeting of delegates of the Warsaw Pact countries on May 27.

This was also the date of the adjournment of the CPC Congress in Peking and the occasion for another blast against the Yugoslavs. The final resolution adopted by the congress condemned Yugoslav "revisionism" and asserted that the Yugoslavs had "played the inglorious role of provocateur and interventionist in the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary." To the best of the writer's knowledge, this was the first time that this charge, which obviously referred to the shelter given to Nagy and some of his colleagues by the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, had been made against the Yugoslavs. On the same day, Khrushchev announced the cancellation of the large unexpended balance of a $285 million credit to Yugoslavia to which Moscow had committed itself in 1956.

In the first issue, published on June 1, of a new Chinese Communist theoretical journal with the militant title of *Red Flag*, the CPC propagandist Chen Po-ta attacked the Yugoslavs, in even stronger terms than had the editorial of May 5, as serving the interests of, and being supported by, the United States. CPC observer Tung Pi-wu repeated the charge in his speech to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Bulgaria on June 3; Soviet observer Khrushchev, addressing the same congress on the same day, was at almost too great pains to deny that any difference existed between his own party and the Chinese over policy toward Yugoslavia.

Since the end of last year, these occurrences within the Soviet bloc had been accompanied by a running counterpoint in the form of a series of Soviet demands for a Summit conference, one of whose major topics would be disarmament. On March 31 the Soviet Government announced a unilateral cessation of nuclear weapons testing. With reference to these overtures, Secretary Dulles said on June 10 that any agreement on cessation of nuclear tests would probably have to include a provision for the stationing of inspectors in Communist China. The next day, Khrushchev wrote another of his famous letters, this one so uncompromising as virtually to rule out a Summit conference. Thereupon Moscow recalled its ambassadors to the Big Three, and Peking recalled its ambassadors to several of the Communist countries, to New Delhi, and to Jakarta, presumably for the purpose

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of holding talks on the question of a Summit conference.

The object of so much of the uproar, Tito, had yet to be heard from. Then, speaking at Labin, in Istria, on June 15, he imputed the major blame for the campaign against him to the Chinese Communists, whom he accused of being willing to accept a major war in order to strengthen their position in Asia. He said that they had so stiffened the Twelve Party Declaration, issued in Moscow in November, 1957, as to make it impossible for the Yugoslavs to sign it. He strongly implied that Peking, because of its serious economic plight, had persuaded Khrushchev to cancel his credit to Yugoslavia, presumably in order to get more credits for itself.

It was at about this time, probably on June 16, that Nagy and his three associates were executed. The news, announced from Budapest on June 17, sent a wave of revulsion around the world and made a Summit conference seem more remote than ever. The next day the *People's Daily* attributed the Hungarian revolt and Nagy's actions to Yugoslav "revisionism."

FROM this narrative, it is as clear as could reasonably be expected that, in keeping with its current hard line on intra-Soviet bloc relations, it was the CPC and not Khrushchev that forced the break with Tito, the cancellation of his credit, and very likely the retreat from the Summit and the execution of Nagy as well. The reasons why the CPC should have done these things are less clear, but it is possible to attempt a reasonable explanation. If it is to solve its own serious economic problems and at the same time make headway against the US in the Far East, the CPC must have further military and economic aid from the Soviet bloc, and especially from the Soviet Union. Soviet aid and credits to Communist China to date total only about $2.5 billion (at the official Soviet exchange rate), all of it to be repaid. No new Soviet commitments of any consequence have been made to Peking since April, 1956, although fulfillment of existing commitments will be in progress for several more years. The Chinese Communist budget for 1957 showed less than $10 million in Soviet credits actually received, and this year's budget so far appears to show none at all. Obviously the cancellation of the Yugoslav credit, announced the day after the conference between Khrushchev and the Chinese Communist economic delegation, could open the way to the transfer of these funds to China.

Apart from the economic consideration, Peking appears to feel that its future position in the Far East will be strong in proportion as the solidarity of the Soviet bloc is "monolithic." Obviously such solidarity will not be promoted by allowing various European Communist Parties, the Poles and Yugoslavs in particular, to thumb their noses at the Soviet Union when they feel so inclined. On the contrary, the CPC has thought it necessary since November, 1956, not only to emphasize Soviet leadership of the Soviet bloc even more loudly than Moscow itself, but to reinforce this point by insisting on the universal applicability of the "path of the October Revolution." This insistence has been rendered both easier and more logical by the obvious recent increase in Soviet power and prestige as the result of the Sputniks and similar developments. Peking also appears to believe that the solidarity of the Soviet bloc and its own interests are not promoted by independent negotiations between any Communist state, even the Soviet Union, and the West. This is all the more true because Communist China is more isolated, diplomatically and otherwise, from the West than the European Communist Parties are and would therefore find it hard to take part in negotiations with the West even if it so desired. The CPC would object in any case to the stationing of foreign inspectors on Chinese soil, but all the more so if, as has been rumored, the Soviet Union is transferring its nuclear testing to Chinese territory since its announcement of March 31, and if Communist China really expects to receive nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union as Chen Yi indicated. The CPC evidently believes that it has not yet attained a position of strength from which it can afford to negotiate.

Tito's Labin speech seems to have been a more accurate analysis of Chinese Communist actions than some others which have emanated from Belgrade and Warsaw. The "anti-rightist struggle" waged by the CPC last summer against its domestic critics must have ruled out any chance of a "peaceful liberation" of Formosa by means of an agreement with the Chinese Nationalists, for it has been made obvious to everyone that there can be no decent life for a non-Communist in Communist China. That being the case, there is no way to "liberate" the island except by force. Peking may therefore be seriously considering, for the first time in more than three years, an attack on Taiwan, or at least on the offshore islands. What lends this interpretation additional plausibility is the fact that, since nearly every one agrees that Taiwan and the offshore islands are Chinese territory, a Communist attack on them would not necessarily be regarded in neutral Asia, whose goodwill Peking seeks even while exerting various pressures on it, as a violation of peaceful coexistence. If it is prepared to throw down so serious a challenge to the United States, which it regards as weakened by economic difficulties and international crises, it needs all the support from the rest of the Soviet bloc that it can get. Negotiations with the West must be prevented, and Yugoslavia's leaders, who deny the efficacy of war as a means of advancing the cause of "socialism," who entertain heterodox doctrines, who have had dealings with the United States, and who have been siphoning off Soviet economic aid which Peking needs and undoubtedly thinks it deserves, must be expelled from the fold. Whether or not the East wind has prevailed over the West wind, it is blowing with gathering force.

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JULY 21, 1958

A Conversation with

WALTER REUTHER

"How Do We Live With Bigness?"

by HENRY BRANDON



BRANDON: What puzzles Europeans most about the American trade union movement is that it has not tried to create its own political party to advance labor's own interest. I mean, trade unionism here sees as its main function the bargaining for higher wages. How do you explain that?

REUTHER: To begin with you need to understand that the structure of American society is, I think, more in a state of flux than is the case of the European countries, and that political parties reflect that essential difference in the structure of our societies. A Labor Party, as such, in America, could not possibly succeed because a political party to succeed has to have groups that go way beyond labor as a group; you've got to have farm groups, you've got to have small businessmen.

The American labor movement is essentially trying to work within the two-party structure, but to bring about a basic realignment so that the two parties really stand for distinct points of view. And I think that this process is happening very rapidly. More and more the Democratic Party is coming to reflect the kind of programs and policies that the American labor movement can support, while the Republican Party more and more becomes the party of big business.

BRANDON: But didn't a lot of labor people vote for the Republican Party in the last election?

REUTHER: Well, some . . . but I think in terms of percentages it was a small percentage. In the Detroit area, the surveys here indicate that about 21 percent of the vote was Republican but only for the Presidency. Because Eisenhower could give us greater assurance of world peace—that obviously had some impact upon working-class groups as well as upon people generally. But I think Detroit is a good example where roughly 80 percent voted for the Democratic candidates and 20 percent for the Republicans.

BRANDON: But if it is possible in England for a labor party to get enough support from a broad section of the public, why shouldn't that be possible here?

REUTHER: Well, I think America is quite different from England. In England you've got a much more rigid class structure—the middle class is less important in England than it is here—and the labor movement in America is developing a whole new middle class. Last year the average automobile worker got more than $5,000 a year income.

BRANDON: Isn't the reason that the labor movement here has not been able to create a broader political base that it has no real ideology apart from bargaining for higher wages?

REUTHER: I think that an ideology is developing. I agree that the original labor movement was basically pure and simple trade unionism — bargaining for wages and for hours and for working conditions. But the labor movement cannot carry out its historic mission if it continues to be no more than that. As the problems of our modern society become more complex and interwoven, their solution cannot be economic or political—the solution has got to be economic *and* political.

And we are developing in that direction. In 1945 and

THIS IS THE SIXTH in a series of conversations tape-recorded originally for the *Sunday Times* of London by its Washington correspondent. HENRY BRANDON's interviews with FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT and others will appear exclusively in this country in coming issues of *The New Republic*.

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'46, for example, we had a strike with the General Motors Corporation and it lasted 113 days. The auto workers had raised a new demand for higher wages without higher prices. We said that the labor movement had to take into consideration the impact of its wage demands upon the price structure, because the price structure may determine the general economic climate and may have an impact upon employment opportunities. Well, in 1945 we were criticized by corporation executives, by people in government, and I think by 80 percent of the leadership of the American labor movement, who took the position that prices are no concern of labor. Yet today—only a few years later—I think that 90 percent of the leadership of the American labor movement now accepts the basic concept in respect to the relationship of wages, prices and profits that we advanced in 1945.

Now the same thing is true about other things. The AFL has moved a long way toward accepting the beginning of an American trade union ideology. In 1932 the AFL convention for the first time went on record in favor of unemployment compensation. They had been against any government action that bore upon the economic position of the wage earner. They wanted only the unions to deal with such things as minimum wages or unemployment compensation. But in 1932 unemployment had become so overwhelming that they knew they couldn't cope with it by pure and simple trade unionism, and therefore they turned to government action. I cite this merely to indicate that gradually we are developing a trade union ideology which is not being borrowed from anywhere. It isn't based upon Marxism; it's not based upon any other preconceived, thought-through philosophy: it's a special American trade union philosophy that is coming out of the problems as they develop in a complex technology.

BRANDON: Why did you think in the early '40's that there was a need for a third party?

REUTHER: Well, at that time we hadn't made as much political progress inside the labor movement itself, and I was influenced in believing at that time that maybe our own party would be a more effective vehicle for getting broader participation than the labor movement itself. It was also true that the Democratic Party earlier was essentially a party in which the major industrial states were controlled by machine politics, and as a result the labor movement was having little influence upon the policies or the programs of those machine-controlled state organizations. We have made considerable progress now. The old machines are falling apart: new leadership is coming up, which more nearly reflects the kind of programs and policies that we think are adequate to meet these new economic and social problems. The combination of these things are the things that have influenced me.

BRANDON: Influenced you that the third party is not necessary—

REUTHER: That's right. I think you can get participation of labor in the structure of the parties on a basis where you can have some influence. The old machines are disintegrating and new forces and new faces are bringing about a basic change. For this reason we felt that instead of trying to create a third party—or labor party—that we ought to try to help accelerate the realignment that is taking place.

I argued with Wayne Morse on this 10 or 12 years ago. We had an educational conference in Cleveland where he said that he disagreed with my philosophy—that we ought to bring about a realignment and get the liberal forces in one party and the conservatives in another party. He argued that this contest ought to go on within each party. I pointed out that in that case no party will ever have the clear-cut policy and the leadership to translate and implement policy, because the power of the party will be diluted on basic questions and the parties will never develop sufficient internal discipline to be effective instruments for carrying out policy. The Democratic Party adopts a good policy, a good program at every convention—just as advanced as the Labour Party. But what happens is that you get the right words in the platform but when the party gets power, because it's "all things to all men," it lacks the internal discipline to translate party platform into specific legislation. So I argued with Wayne Morse that he ought to be in the Democratic Party! He couldn't see that; he said that he was needed in the Republican Party because he raised a liberal challenge in the party. Well, he got over that.

BRANDON: How do you foresee the relationship between the labor movement and the Democratic Party, because it seems that up to now it was the Democratic Party that wagged the tail.

REUTHER: Well, I would be opposed to the labor movement trying to capture the Democratic Party. I think that at the point the labor movement captures the Democratic Party, you then destroy the broad base that is essential to make a political party an effective instrument to translate sound policy into governmental action. The essential problem for the labor movement is to learn to work with a party without trying to capture it.

BRANDON: But in Britain a man of your calibre and your oratorical gift would have a good chance to become Prime Minister. You haven't got that in this country—or do you think you have?

REUTHER: I suppose that the day will come when a labor leader could aspire to the top job of America. I personally do not aspire to that. I mean, I have no political ambitions whatsoever. I made a decision a long time ago that what little contribution I could make I would make inside the labor movement, trying to get American labor to mature philosophically and to change its basic character. The labor movement can only be effective if it becomes less an economic movement and more a social movement.

BRANDON: To European ears American trade union leaders sound often like capitalists, when they praise the free

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enterprise system, yet they often act like socialists, when they advocate profit-sharing systems, for example.

REUTHER: The American labor movement is as radical on basic things as the European labor movement, but we don't dress our things up with socialist slogans because we are not essentially committed to a socialist philosophy. We are pragmatic; if a thing will work, we are for doing it—if it's radical or conservative—we're for doing it. We are committed to the free enterprise system because by and large it has worked. Now it has a lot of defects, but instead of trying to overthrow the system and substitute in its place a nationalized economic system, where we have to bargain with the government, we prefer to bargain with the private employer, but we prefer to make him more responsible. And so what we do . . . we sit down and we talk through and think through what are the basic deficiencies in the free enterprise system, what can we do economically and politically to overcome these deficiencies and to make the system work more in the interest of the common good. That's why we've come up with the guaranteed annual wage. This didn't come out of the socialist labor movement; it came out of a free enterprise labor movement. That's why we came up with a privately negotiated pension plan to supplement the governmental plan. When this was first raised some of my socialist friends in the European labor movement thought that we were going to destroy the government system. We said, "No, this is a simple way by which we can use the special leverage that we have at the bargaining table to facilitate greater progress through governmental action." And we said, "At the point that we tie together the private system of pensions with the government system of pensions, instead of weakening the government system we're going to make it stronger."

And what happened? For 12 years under Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, where we had favorable governmental climate to make progress on pensions and social security, we made no progress whatever. Then we said: Okay, we've got to use our leverage at the bargaining table to try to facilitate greater progress through legislation. And in Ford, which was the first pension plan negotiated, we tied together the private benefits with the public benefits and within 48 hours after we adopted the Ford pension system, where we required the employer to pay the total cost of the private pension, as contrasted to the worker paying half and the employer paying half in the public system, we got action out of Congress that we were unable to get in 12 years. Our private negotiations did more to accelerate progress and to make stronger our public social security system than anything we ever did through governmental action.

BRANDON: It seems to me that something akin to a corporate structure has developed in this country. You have industry, which set up a very strong position in order to counter labor, and labor which set up a very strong monopoly position to withstand industry. It makes government intervention in this recession more difficult.

REUTHER: Well, the government can do a great deal about the present recession. It isn't . . . because I don't think they know quite what they're fighting. Mr. Eisenhower's problem and the problem of his advisers is he doesn't know whether to fight recession or inflation—and he has to fight them both. The result is there's a great deal of indecision there and lack of any specific action.

I think first of all that you've got to recognize that big corporations, big industry, are inevitable, based upon our technology. You can have small companies in a relatively simple, technical situation; you cannot have small companies in a period of automation and electronics and down the road the peaceful use of the atom. I mean, as our technology becomes more complex, as it takes a greater and greater investment of capital to provide one job for one worker, industry is going to be more and more concentrated. That is an inevitable development. I think this old liberal concept that bigness was evil and that smallness had a natural virtue is a lot of nonsense. You can have small tyrants as well as big tyrants. Now big labor is a by-product of the same technological facts of life as big industry is. You can't have small unions dealing with General Motors; you've got to have big unions, strong unions.

The question that arises is not: Do we want to escape from a world of bigness, big corporations, big unions and big government? The question is how do we live with bigness and make it responsive to basic human needs. How do we avoid the human individual getting lost in the shuffle, in the wilderness of bigness? Well, this is a matter which needs a great deal of time and careful thinking through. And this is an area in which our union is working.

Inside of our union, for example, we have created what we call a Public Review Board, to which we have designated seven prominent, leading citizens, and given them constitutional authority to review and to modify, to affirm or to reject completely, any decision that we make with respect to the individual who has a grievance within the union. In other words, we are willing to have an outside, public group of prominent citizens review our stewardship of the internal workings of our union because, in effect, we believe that we have taken on responsibilities and power that goes with those responsibilities that makes us sort of a quasi-public organization; and that, therefore, we have to be prepared to have our basic decisions subject to public review, based upon the standards of public conduct that we would expect a government official to meet.

BRANDON: What about big corporations?

REUTHER: Well, we proposed before the Kefauver Committee that we ought to give consideration to creating a governmental mechanism that would be a sort of public watchdog on the price structure. If a corporation in any given industry is responsible for 20 percent or more of the total production of that industry—now this would not

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affect too many companies—that company would be free to set prices but it could not increase its price except by prior notice to this governmental agency, and the governmental agency would then hold public hearings. This company would then be required publicly to defend the economics that it believed supported its need for a price increase. If it came there and said higher wages were responsible, then the trade union that was demanding higher wages would have to defend publicly its demand.

Now I believe it's this sort of thing that needs to be developed so that we can make private decisions more publicly responsible. The only other way to do this is to have the government do it, and you have no assurance that government decisions will be responsible either.

Now there are some areas in which the government has to move. The real problem in the field of technology, as automation and electronics and the peaceful use of the atom develop, is going to be that industry is compartmentalized. General Motors Corporation, the Ford Motor Company, the Chrysler Corporation will know all about automation and the future impact upon the automotive industry. General Electric Company, Westinghouse, will know the same thing for their industry. Dupont Chemical will know it for the chemical industry—and so on down the line. The problem is that no one is in a position to look at the total economy in terms of the accumulation of these separate impacts.

You take the question of atomic power. If you trace the industrial development of America you will find that essentially the pattern of industry grew out of and reflected the sources of power. Now with atomic energy coming in, you can put the plant anywhere, because a truckload of atomic fuel will operate a big plant for several years. And that means that we can now begin to plan: we can arbitrarily decide to have an industry anywhere.

Now—what should be the role of government? Well, we don't want a big bureaucracy that sits in Washington pretending that it knows all the answers to these complex problems. What we want is a governmental clearing house, a place where you can have a top group periodically sit down and evaluate, and based upon their evaluation and their recommendation have the private decisions then attempt to translate and implement these broad policies.

Some people will say: Isn't this kind of a supra-planning board? Well, call it what you want, the difference being that it does not make the decisions—it makes recommendations, it makes available information, it's a clearing house where you can come to find out what rational answers there are to these kinds of problems.

BRANDON: You mentioned automation. . . . Now it seems to me there are two serious problems for the future of the trade union movement. One is the impact of automation and the other that white-collar workers are now outnumbering blue-collar workers.

REUTHER: Well, the problem of automation is actually the problem of learning to live with abundance, and the only way you can learn to live with abundance is to learn to manage it, and the only way you can manage it is to share it. There are really two basic questions. Number one: We've got to learn to distribute the abundance that we know how to make. Number two: Ultimately we've got to find a way so that people can be given a more rational means of choosing between gadgets and leisure.

How many cars should a family have? How many television sets? How many bathrooms do we need in an ordinary house? Ultimately when we have reached that plateau of economic living standards, where the law of diminishing returns sets in very rapidly, we've got to give people the educational background, the stimulations so that they would be interested in another kind of consumption. And that means the ability and the desire to spend a larger portion of their time, not making gadgets, but in the pursuit of constructive and creative leisure. We will be confronted very soon with this very real problem, that we may overfeed the outer man and starve the inner man.

The thing that bothers me is that the fellow working in the Cadillac Motor Company making the Cadillac motor car can be a part of making that Cadillac, and yet when he looks at it he gets no sense of creative achievement. In an earlier technology, a craftsman—no matter what he made—there was a little bit of him in what he made. There was a sense of creation. And when God made us in his own image, he also gave to each of us some creative capacity. That is being starved.

We've got to begin now to stimulate people in terms of interest, in terms of knowing how to find a way to achieve creative expression in our leisure hours.

BRANDON: But we may then have your — let's call them "tycoons of leisure"—go fishing and learning how to paint, how to garden—while the working class of the professionals, the scientists, teachers, doctors, civil servants—will be working long hours. I'm wondering whether this will not spark off a new kind of class war between the haves of leisure and the have-nots of leisure.

REUTHER: I think that we're going to have to shift more people into these categories. We obviously need more doctors; there's already a very acute shortage of medical personnel in America. There are thousands of young people with the potential capacity to make wonderful medical people but they don't have the economic resources to get access to medical education. So that our society as a part of this whole question of working out a proper balance between gadgets and between leisure has also to work out a proper balance in the area of human services—teachers, medicine, music, etc.

All of these things are a matter of deciding what kind of society we are really trying to make. Are we trying to build a society so that every kid of 18 has a sport car, every room in a house has a built-in television, and we have so much plumbing in the house that you need three

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plumbers on every block to keep it going? We are now in that place in human history where instead of the few on top having access to culture based upon the poverty of the great mass at the bottom, because there wasn't enough to go around, we can now give the great mass of people access to culture and learning and the opportunities to facilitate the growth of the inner man.

Now the trade union movement is important only as it facilitates these long-range objectives. Automation is important only as it provides the tools to create the economic base upon which the mass can have access to what only the few have had access to in the past.

BRANDON: But the satiation point of the minority is necessarily far above the satiation point of the majority and there are two types of satisfaction available to a minority that could never be made available to the majority: For instance, expenditure on direct personal services—scarce amenities—and certain types of housing. You could never, I think, make all these available to a majority.

REUTHER: Well, today in our society, success essentially is associated with the acquisition of material wealth—and, in a sense, with conspicuous consumption, but ultimately in the kind of society that I envision there's going to be a shift in these values. I think that once everyone has all these things, the fact that somebody has an extra one is not going to impress anybody. "Conspicuous consumption" can be an outward measurement of success only as long as other people can't match it. At the point everyone has all the things that they need essentially, then the values that get associated with having three Cadillacs are going to go. And in their place we're going to develop new and more fundamental values. And in that kind of context the sort of thing you're talking about will change radically. Now I don't want to say exactly how it will be because I don't know. It'll be different, that I do know.

There's going to be a shift in the next 25 years—the number of people in personal industries is going to increase tremendously. And this is going to bring about quite a difference in the structure of our whole society in terms of the economic groupings.

BRANDON: But what is this going to do to the trade union movement?

REUTHER: It's going to change its character. The trade union movement will obviously have to change in order to reflect this new relationship, and if it doesn't it obviously will become less and less important. If it does, it will become more important.

BRANDON: How do you think it should reflect this change?

REUTHER: I think more and more it has to fight for economic policies that reflect the needs of our whole society. I think the UAW is making a beginning.

You take this profit-sharing idea. This has frightened a lot of people because they don't understand why we propose this. The profit-sharing idea was not a demand; it was a mechanism. In the profit-sharing scheme we're trying to find a rational means by which free labor and free management, sitting at the bargaining table, can attempt to work out in their relationship practical means by which you can equate the competing equities—in workers and stockholders and consumers.

Now the problem we have is that no one has a crystal ball that is sufficiently reliable so that we could anticipate what's going to happen next year. So we have said that what we ought to do is to work out the equities in two stages in which we deliberately understate the size of the equity of the wage earner in our minimum demand, so that we will be certain that it will have no inflationary impact. Then we defer the realization of the balance of his equity. Our problem is: How do you find a way to work out the sharing of an economic pie when you don't know how large it is? So we say: Give us a down payment now—represented by our minimum demand—and we will defer the realization of the balance of our equity until you've completed the year, the consumer has paid his price and you've made your profits.

Now this is not an original idea. The General Motors, Ford and Chrysler Corporations do it exactly this way with respect to their executives. They give them a down payment in terms of the base salary, which is supplemented at the end of the year by a share in the profits. They get a share in the profits, not as a stockholder but as an employee. We're asking for a share of the profits because we don't know any other rational way by which we can get our full equity on a basis of certainty that we won't create any inflationary pressures.

BRANDON: Do you consider this recession as a motor car recession?

REUTHER: No, it's general . . . the problem has been here that we came out of a war period with tremendous accumulation of purchasing power and a backlog of demand for civilian goods because we didn't produce these things during the war. And American industry then started the greatest expansion program in history—as we should have. But what happened was we over-expanded in terms of the purchasing power. We put $285 billion into plant expansion and modernization in the past 10 years in America. In the motor car industry, we put $7.2 billion. Now anyone with any common sense at all or any understanding of economics would have known that at the point you expand American productive capacity by building $285 billion worth of new and more modern, more efficient factories that ultimately you have to expand the market to absorb the greater productivity. Now this is where we got into trouble. We didn't shift over to the expansion of purchasing power quick enough.

BRANDON: To come back to the way you picture the future—it was quite clear that labor unions would lose a lot of their membership with people moving into the professional classes, with automation putting workers out of work.

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How do you see the future for the trade unions?

REUTHER: Well, the industrial membership of the trade union movement proportionately will decline as automation makes it possible to produce more with fewer workers. But the membership of the trade union movement in these other fields will increase.

BRANDON: But you haven't been very successful so far in enrolling white-collar workers.

REUTHER: That's because our industrial revolution had its first impact upon the industrial workers and the second phase of it will have its greatest impact upon the non-industrial worker.

There's no question about it—automation is going to have a greater impact upon the clerical worker in an office than upon the factory worker, because you can standardize office procedure routine—you don't come out with a new model every year. And as the impact of automation becomes more apparent, you're going to find these workers organizing in order to protect themselves.

BRANDON: Since the appearance of Sputnik, some of the more thoughtful people have been asking whether the American ability to turn out consumer goods—its generally spectacular capacity to produce—is still one of the elements of its greatest strength, for in this thermonuclear age all-out war would be very brief; there would be no time to convert industry to war use. The question asked is, therefore: What sort of gap lies today between ordinary industrial productivity and the achievement necessary to cope with the nuclear age? Are the long, shiny cars and the splendidly finished refrigerators a drain on security?

REUTHER: Well, I personally think that America and I think, in a sense, the whole free world has not fully comprehended the dimensions of the challenge that we face in the world, and I think that accounts for a kind of a "business-as-usual" attitude, "diplomacy-as-usual" attitude. I don't think this is a matter of choosing between having nice motor cars and having these other things—I think we can have both if we fully utilize the productive potential of the American economy. Our problem here, primarily, is that we need to put more effort into education—and to find a way to get the American people to be willing to put into that educational system a larger percentage of our gross national product. And here again it isn't a matter of taking that away from something else; it's a matter of realizing the potential. In the last four years we lost roughly $96 billion in gross national product because of underutilization in both manpower and industrial capacity. Now, the thing you're talking about can be paid for out of that.

Our trouble is not that we are inferior to the Russians; we're not incapable of meeting their challenge—our problem is that we are not trying. We have really not worked out what I call a set of national priorities, in which we put first things first, and then commit our industrial capacity and our economic and human resources to the achievement of these priorities. We really don't know what we're fighting for. The tragedy is that we're still essentially moving based upon negative reflexes; we're still only fighting against something.

I happen to think that the Russians, knowing essentially what we know about the H-bomb, have made a decision. I don't think there's going to be an H-bomb war unless some mistake is made somewhere—somebody just pulls the trigger, presses the button. The Communists have been compelled to re-evaluate their dogmas and to come up with a decision that they can't take over by destroying the bourgeois state by force of arms—that since the bourgeois state has the H-bomb and they have the H-bomb, there will be no world to inherit. So I think they are going to concentrate on economic penetration and political subversion. That's the area in which we're either going to win or lose. I think we've got to be strong on the military front to check aggression or possible aggression, but I think that we've got to realize that the real challenge is on the economic and social fronts.

BRANDON: What do you think we should be doing?

REUTHER: Well, it would take so little to help save India in terms of what we're spending for military purposes. A billion dollars the next couple of years would make the difference in India being successful with her Second Five-Year-Plan.

The great tragedy came home to me so clearly—when I was in India last. I was up in Northern India where they're building this huge dam, and they were using equipment made by the members of our union in Peoria, Illinois, in the Caterpillar Tractor Works, huge earth-moving machines and they were shifting the mountain. Behind the big earth-moving machines there were hundreds of workers with little straw baskets. They'd fill these baskets with wooden shovels and women and children would carry them away on their heads. And I asked the chief engineer that if they could get more of this machinery from America could they complete the dam earlier in order to harness the monsoon rains one season earlier. He said yes, they could do that but they couldn't afford to buy these machines. We had 19,000 workers in the Peoria plant—there are only 12,000 now and they're working three to four days a week—and there are acres and acres and acres of these machines parked down there. If India had one week, not of the whole production, but one week of the production that we are losing by unemployment, it would give them enough machines to finish these dams and roads and irrigation projects.

I happen to believe that these billions lost in underproduction can be the margin of survival, because it's in this area that freedom has got to demonstrate its superiority—the capacity to take care of basic human problems within the framework of human freedom. And the great tragedy in America is not that the Russians are better than we are—they're just doing better because they're trying and we aren't.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Dixie—Withdrawal Without Defeat

by Charles L. Black, Jr.

THERE is a passion in the human heart stronger than the desire to be free from injustice and wrong, and that is the desire to inflict injustice and wrong upon others, and men resent more keenly an attempt to prevent them from oppressing other people than they do the oppression from which they themselves suffer.

THUS Lord Palmerston, and these books bear him out. They tell not only of regional self-pity and frustrated rage, in the face of threatened severance from that valued psychic perquisite of which he wrote, but also of the fight that is being waged, now flailingly, now cunningly, to hang on to it as long as possible.

Neither Black Nor White, by Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely (Rinehart; $5). *An Epitaph for Dixie*, by Harry S. Ashmore (Norton; $3.50).

The Dykeman-Stokely book collects, under rather loose topical headings, a large number of incidents and interviews, each illustrating some aspect of Southern attitude toward the impending change. This plan has its merits and its demerits. A clear thesis, so far as I could make out, is lacking, unless one gives that status to the authors' patent and explicit sympathy with those who are combatting racism in the South. But the book is a rich mine of material; it looks at the situation from very many sides, and offers a wealth of concrete detail about men and events.

Mr. Ashmore's book cuts a less wide swath of anecdote, though what he does garner in this line is presented with a vivid skill expectable in a great newspaperman. His book is the more structured and reasoned of the two. Diagnosis and prognosis, implicit in a sense in the title, are a little hard to summarize in a formula. Generally, Mr. Ashmore believes that the old way had elements of value in it, but that it is as good as dead and requires now to be decently buried, with an honorable epitaph. He sees the course of history that has led to the present troubles as essentially tragic. The South had a chance to solve the problem of race, and almost took it, but, through some fatal flaw, turned its back on this chance and chose rather the ultimately untenable position of refusal to solve the problem, and of insistence that it did not need to be solved—that, indeed, it was already solved by the dooming of millions of American citizens to disenfranchisement, helotry, and denial of justice.

It would be easy to leave these books with a feeling of pessimism. The forecast is one of storm. Perhaps that is what has to be—the dominant caste in the South locked in struggle with the rest of the nation. If that happens, then the nation has got to win, unless we want to surrender all pretense that the concept of American citizenship effectively prevails from border to border, or that the law of the nation is really law. And, of course, if we thus devalued our national citizenship and our national law, the nation itself would soften into a mere territorial conglomerate, utterly lacking the firm structure and tone necessary for survival in the world of today, or perhaps of any day. So the choice before us may be the choice of 1861: War, with subtler weapons than then, or loss of nationhood, again subtler and more creeping than then, but none the less real.

But these books also contain ground for hope that we may not be driven to this choice. In the face of ostracism, boycott and bombing, some Southern people are speaking out and acting against racism, and calling for compliance not only with law but with the something more than law that makes it seem to them folly or blasphemy or mere absurdity to refuse human association to fellow men. Here and there, throughout the South, is a teacher who takes his professional (and sometimes his personal) life in his hands, an editor who defies the threat of cancellation of subscriptions and advertising, a minister who refuses to go along with the color gloss on his Gospel, a humorist who jibes at the grotesqueness of what Mr. Ashmore calls "such monumental irrelevancies as where a man should sit on a street-car."

If these few people were all there were, they might still be a leaven in time. But it seems reasonable to think that they are the part of the iceberg that shows. It is pretty clear that this is true in the not-so-Deep South states. In Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, and a few other states at least, the undoubted majority of whites who are committed to the maintenance of the caste system is by no means the monolithic majority that some have projected from the utterances of the more vocal. And it is questionable how far even the majority is really willing to go in defying the clear legal command of a court order.

The South has another chance. It is not as clean-cut a chance as the first one, but it is a chance nevertheless. One of the biggest problems is the opening of a way of dignified and honorable withdrawal. Under opportunistic and irresponsible leadership, stands of intransigence have been publicly taken. Being openly defeated and forced to eat crow is a thing the South does not like; memory is still fresh.

THERE are at least two possible ways out of this, if the necessary wisdom can be found. The first is implicit in the escape hatch which has usually appeared, in one form or another, in Southern manifestoes. Resistance, in a typical phrase, is to be by "all *legal* means." Firm judicial and executive action can make it plain that no legal means are available.

Secondly, communities might elect to act ahead of clear court mandate, with the appearance (and, to some extent, the reality) of voluntariness which this could give. This again would call for a wisdom in leadership which can be hoped for if not too optimistically looked for.

Maybe neither of these things, or anything like them, will happen. Even so, there is a second line of hope. Unquestionably, the maintenance of segregation is going to have to rely increasingly on illegal violence and fraud. It is probable that the great majority of Southern people will in the end be disgusted by the

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position in which this places them, and react, in sufficient numbers, against the leaders that have guided them, by verbal cloud and fire, into such tortured ways. This process too, if properly managed, need not have the flavor of full defeat. A revolt of conscience against dynamiting and duplicity is rather a victory, and could be so presented. "We could have stood you off indefinitely, but we scorn the means we would have had to use."

What is the part of the rest of the nation in all this? As I have argued elsewhere, firmness in enforcing desegregation seems to me the proper policy. I would stress here two other sorts of firmness: firmness in protecting Negro voting, and firmness in shielding those people of both races who have exposed themselves, or will in future do so, to the reprisals that menace those who crack the apparent monolith of Southern white opinion.

If any numerically significant break should occur among the whites, the possibility of successful ouster of diehard leaders would obviously be increased if the changing white votes could be augmented by those of Negroes. Legal weapons for protection of voting, forged by the "political" (*i.e.*, threat-of-filibuster) process, are pretty blunt. But they have some utility. Very badly needed, too, is the education of the Negroes themselves to the use of the franchise.

As to the second point, the nation has declared, through its regular organs, that segregation violates constitutional rights. It can be argued that there is, nevertheless, justification for some deliberateness in forcing the end of segregation itself. But our national honor is not worth a plugged nickel if we refuse to protect those few Southerners who are now actively struggling to bring the Constitution down to the Southern earth. The free speech guarantee alone can go far toward doing this job, and it is up to the courts, and to the Executive in the last resort, to use it.

The Attachment to Misery

by Gordon Merrick

BERNARD MALAMUD, who has written two highly praised novels, *The Natural* and *The Assistant,* has now published his first collection of short stories. To many, the short story is a nuisance—lacking the space to grow freely, too often responding to captivity by turning in upon itself and resorting to trickery—and a collection of them is simply a collection of nuisances. I, for one, cannot think of an important novelist who doesn't appear oddly shrunken and incomplete in his short stories. Malamud is no exception. A couple of the thirteen stories in "The Magic Barrel" are extraordinarily bad. Of the eleven remaining, three or four soar, bright and terrifying, in a world of fantasy where anything might happen. The rest are inconclusive, saved by moral fervor here, a skillfully sustained mood there. It is on the whole an impressive performance, but from it Malamud emerges an uneven writer.

The Magic Barrel, by Bernard Malamud (Farrar, Straus and Cudahy; $3.75).

Let us start with "The Magic Barrel" which appears last in this volume. This is the way it begins:

> Not long ago there lived in uptown New York, in a small, almost meagre room, though crowded with books, Leo Finkle, a rabbinical student in the Yeshivah University. Finkle, after six years of study, was to be ordained in June and had been advised by an acquaintance that he might find it easier to win a congregation if he were married.

The grammar falters occasionally but no matter. This is the way to write a short story. In the next sentence we learn that Leo will seek a bride through a marriage broker and we're off. The marriage broker proposes. Leo rejects. In the course of his search, Leo comes to the realization that in choosing a wife in this way he is rejecting love, that he has never known love, that consequently even his religion is a sham. Having progressed so far, Leo is inadvertently allowed by the marriage broker to see a photograph of a girl whom he recognizes immediately as the girl he must have. It is the marriage broker's turn to protest. She is no wife for a rabbi. With tears in his eyes, he confesses that she is his own daughter, "wild — without shame." Loyal to his new-found vision of love, Leo insists and eventually the marriage broker gives in. We are led up to the meeting between Leo and the girl, while the marriage broker, " . . . leaning against a wall, chanted prayers for the dead."

That is all of the plot. And that is all there need be. There is nothing poetic about Malamud's prose and yet he achieves lyricism through the wide-ranging play of his imagination, the richness of his emotion, the intricacy of his perceptions. None of the characters in "The Magic Barrel" is quite what he seems to be, the supernatural is constantly hinted at and we find that Malamud's deceptively effortless and colloquial style is capable of sustaining an allegory of complexity and depth.

BY contrast, let us look at "The Lady of the Lake," a story almost wholly without merit. This time, we are introduced to a young man named Levin who inherits some money and goes to Europe, where he decides to call himself Henry R. Freeman. As Freeman, he has a chance encounter on an island in Lake Maggiore with a beautiful girl who introduces herself as Isabella del Dongo and immediately, to the total destruction of any surprise the story might have, asks Levin if he is Jewish. This Freeman-Levin denies. Since the island belongs to the ancient del Dongo family, his mind is soon filled with dreams of taking home a rich, beautiful and aristocratic bride. Of course, he suffers pangs at having deceived her but decides that what she doesn't know won't hurt her. There are secret rendezvous, a moonlit swim during which the protagonists take off all their clothes, the usual paraphernalia, in short, of a woman's magazine romance. All this builds to the revelation—oh irony!—that just as Levin is not Freeman, the girl is no del Dongo but a simple Jewish girl whose "past is meaningful" to her. Levin's deception costs him his love.

Although nowhere else does Malamud descend to the level of this embarrassing tale, it marks his limitations as a writer. His intense seriousness makes him ill at ease with the lighter or more familiar emotions. One of the more successful stories in this collection, "The Mourn-

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ers," is about an old man so passionately attached to his miserable lodging that even when he is forcibly evicted and left in the street he refuses to abandon it. Another, "The Last Mohican," is about the inner torment of an American in Rome who refuses to give a suit to an old friend called Susskind who pursues him in the street. And so it goes. The plot of the stories lies in the clash of moral and ethical attitudes.

Malamud has no interest in character as such. His response is not to the individual but to the tragedy of the human condition in its most general aspects. He has humor but, springing out of a sorrow too great to be contained, it verges on hysteria, and he displays here no sense of the ridiculous. It is this lack which seems at times a lack of taste and which gives his lesser pieces a sort of vulgar absurdity.

MOVIES

A Baby and a Trifle

THE PHRASE "facts of life" has been pretty well battered by euphemists, but let us risk saying that Jean Gabin's new film, *The Case of Dr. Laurent*, is concerned with the fact of life. It deals not with sex but with childbirth, and although it is in no technical or artistic sense a great film, it is one of the most satisfying pictures to appear in a long time. For, with skill, point, and poignancy, it illuminates some of the hopeful and endearing qualities in human beings, and it makes the arrival of a new member of the tribe seem the most dramatic and portentous of events.

None of this is stated; the film is quite unpretentious; but that is the net with which it leaves us. Not the blue- or pink-bootied greeting-card sugar-drop but the babe fresh from the womb, gleaming with placental juices, blind and struggling and insistent on breath, is the hero of this picture. It is his coming that is prepared for ninety minutes and it is his appearance that almost literally makes us cheer.

The story might be described as a serious *Dr. Knock*. Gabin is the Parisian Dr. Laurent who, for reasons of health, has bought the practice of an old doctor in an Alpes-Maritimes village. But he has come with no get-rich-quick scheme although he differs radically from his predecessor. He is an advocate of "natural childbirth," and the simple plot tells how he overcomes the prejudices of both the villagers and his neighboring fellow-physicians. The only expectant mother who will try his method at first is an unmarried farm girl who is not so much convinced of Laurent's beliefs as driven by the villagers' hostility toward the warmth of his sympathy. Together he and she work through the months of her pregnancy, beset by popular and professional sniping. At last he is summoned before a medical board to answer charges. He is seemingly cornered, but in a finish more rousing than any marines-to-the-rescue dash, the girl makes a wild bus-ride through the mountains with some friends to the county seat and gives birth to her baby before the medical tribunal to prove the validity of Laurent's teaching. The actual birth is shown in considerable detail. The excitement, the effort, the joy of the young mother as she brings forth her child—under the doctor's direction, as it were—and the child's emergence, all these make a scene which deserves only one adjective: thrilling.

The picture has been made with taste but also, equally importantly, with professional competence. It might have been tasteful but boring or didactic; instead it is always interesting, frequently amusing, and generally suspenseful. The director, Jean-Paul le Chanois, who wrote the script with René Barjavel, has been careful to concentrate on characterization and human interaction rather than on preachment, and has filled the picture with that sense of life flowing around it—during, before and after—which good French films so often achieve. As the farm girl Nicole Courcel is healthily charming, and Sylvia Monfort is affecting as the young wife whose childbed agony opens the picture and whose conversion to Laurent's principles aids it conclusion.

Gabin is surely one of the best film actors alive. Can anyone forget him trapped by the police in his tiny room in *Daybreak* or that moment when, bidding farewell to Dita Parlo in *Grand Illusion,* he lifted her child and said, *"Lotte hat blaue Augen"?* These are highpoints in any contemporary filmgoers' experience, and if in recent years he has avoided the passionate, he has explored even further his powers of sheer manifestation of humanity and what may be called intensified credibility. If he said, "We must all now walk on our hands," I for one should go at once and buy a pair of gloves.

In fine, *The Case of Dr. Laurent* is, I suppose, propaganda, but if so, it is propaganda which is better than painless, it is pleasurable. I haven't seen a film like it since *Mandy,* that fine English picture in which Jack Hawkins played the director of a school for deaf-mute children. It is probably appropriate to note that the Legion of Decency has given *Dr. Laurent* a "separate classification," approving it for adults and older adolescents, and that it was shown at the AMA convention in San Francisco to the approval of thousands of doctors. But don't let these facts stop you from going and enjoying yourself.

TRIFLE, as every visitor to Britain knows, is a light fluffy dessert topped with whipped cream. The new Ingrid Bergman-Cary Grant film, *Indiscreet,* which was filmed largely in London, is a trifle in that as well as the other sense. It is unessential but pleasant. There are two faults. Not enough use was made of the city of London, which is a pity because the color in this Warner Brothers film is good. And Miss Bergman, although she still has the ability to fall in love in a way to make the male viewer jealous of her leading man, is neither a deft comedienne nor convincing as a star of the English theatre. But Cary Grant and Cecil Parker are gifted *farceurs,* Phyllis Calvert is a nice peanut-brittle sister to Miss Bergman, and the script by Norman Krasna, from his play *Kind Sir,* does adequately what a farce ought to do: it supplies logical surprises both in dialogue and plot. The story deals with a man who conceals something about his matrimonial status during an affair, but what he conceals should not be revealed here or it will spoil your fun in the film. Which it can handily give you on a summer evening.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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ART

Market Notes on Pictures

THE FIELD of art is probably the last area of buying and selling in which a truly free market obtains and in which price really is determined by the relationship between supply and demand and very little else. Until the last couple of years it was generally supposed that demand and hence price were at least influenced by some considerations of intrinsic quality, however vague. The successful putting in orbit of Impressionist and Post-Impressionist prices in Paris, London and New York has demolished that theory. As the price range for French pictures mounted breathtakingly into space, reaching its current high in the Lurcy sale last November at Parke-Bernet, a corollary came to be universally accepted, namely that while Renoir and Gauguin led all the rest, they and their fellows were merely out in front of a general art rise, corresponding roughly, perhaps, to the upward readjustment of the American stock market in the early fifties.

The assumption seemed both logical and reassuring. In practice it was projected forward in time, with the French 20th Century men right behind their fathers and contemporary Americans trailing but still commanding good stiff prices. In theory, the assumption was projected backward, too. It was taken for granted that the big names of the 15th through the 18th Centuries would move at least as high as the Impressionists. This too was logical, though not exactly reassuring to the large number of smaller institutions and the relatively few private collectors who would like to enter the Old Master market.

For the last two days I have been studying the priced catalogue of a sale at Sotheby's, London, on June 25. Up for auction was the last installment of what Sotheby's reasonably called "the greatest assemblage of paintings formed in this country during the 19th Century," the Cook collection of Doughty House. Assuming that everything about the sale was on the up and up, all you can say is that the backward projection of the upward readjustment just ain't so.

The Cook collection had 136 Italian, French, Dutch, Flemish and English paintings and brought $517,344.

The first session of the Lurcy sale, which covered most of the paintings and drawings, had 65 items from Boudin to Picasso and brought $1,708,500.

Let us look at some comparable details, taking, in each case, Cook first.

There were six Rembrandts. A couple went at such prices that you feel the bidders must have seriously doubted the attributions. But a portrait of an old man similar to the one in Kaiser Friedrich Museum brought $4,200 and a Circumcision $1,260. Both were small pictures, but neither of these prices is paid for a doubtful work. Switching to New York, a Boudin harbor scene of the same size went for $12,500. Would anyone seriously estimate Boudin's value at three times Rembrandt's?

A large Rubens-and-assistants "Holy Family," $4,340; a quite small Vuillard of two women at the Tuileries, $70,000.

A large Poussin of Venus and Adonis in amorous dalliance, $3,360; a loose Suzanne Valadon of a girl and couple of cows in the country, $7,750. A Suzanne Valadon!

A Claude Lorrain, $1,540; a watercolor by André Derain, $6,500.

A Pentecost from Botticelli's workshop, $10,640; a Picasso crayon drawing of flowers and leaves in a lightly sketched pitcher, $10,000.

What looks to be a first-rate Van Dyck portrait, $7,840; a Degas pastel sketch of four dancers, half length, $50,000.

That's the way it goes all through both books. Random selections from the Lurcy list chill the heart: Pissarro, $57,000; Matisse, $25,000; a tiny Braque, $12,000; Monet, $92,500; Sisley, $35,000; Toulouse-Lautrec, $95,000; Raoul Dufy, $26,000; Soutine, $19,000. Bingo, as is well known, went to Gauguin at $180,000 and Renoir at $200,000, neither in really great examples.

The obvious conclusion is that now is the time to concentrate on the available works of the earlier masters. Even the private collector, if he has the time, is a lot better off either in young talent or old masters than with the mad millionaires from the Pont Neuf to the Bateau Lavoir.

Once you recover from the sheer horror of the present market for the Impressionists and those who came after, the question lingers, Why? There's been a certain amount of talk about late Impressionism and especially Monet from 1916 until his death leaping right over Cubism and all that to relate directly to the Abstract Expressionism of the moment, but that connection is really strained. The resemblances between the large late water lilies and, say, Pollack are entirely superficial and not very strong even superficially, being based chiefly on isolating a couple of square feet of Monet and comparing them to complete Pollacks.

DANIEL CATTON RICH claims it's a woman's taste: women are really doing the buying and they're buying feminine pictures. A second generation New York dealer I know says that the Impressionists and their children were a fresh and exciting thing in New York when today's buyers were children themselves. It's like the bank president buying out the candy store. He adds that after a certain tax bracket, the difference between $10,000 and $100,000 is very hard to make out. The late Francis Henry Taylor noted the "lack of relation of these prices to the quality of the works of art. We are discussing second rate art."

For myself, I think all these reasons apply and I would add a really unexpected revival of the relic trade which died with the middle ages. The painting is not so much object of virtue as the painter is saint, radiating mysterious power in everything from his hand. The girl who ends up with Picasso's wardrobe will have a fortune before she even touches the paintings.

FRANK GETLEIN


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Notes on Contributors

CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., teaches at the Yale Law School. GORDON MERRICK is a young American novelist whose most recent book is *The Hot Season.*

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

paign. If Mr. Winner is speaking of the French Army, he is correct; the Army was not in Algeria when the revolution started. If Mr. Winner is speaking of France as a nation and a government, he is simply wrong. The French have been torturing and murdering, not only in North Africa but also in West Africa and in Madagascar, since the end of the war.

In January, 1953, in Paris, I met a Frenchman, wounded veteran of World War I and a life-long resident of Algeria, who not long before had been arrested in the middle of the night and deported to France, by the Algerian administration. His crime—being too friendly with the Moslems. He told a small group of Americans and French that one of his servants, and many other Moslems that he knew, had been arrested, beaten, and tortured by the police.

Since the end of World War II, it has been French policy to stamp out all independence movements in their colonies by mass murders and executions. In Madagascar they put down an independence movement which had neither killed nor threatened to kill; and in putting it down they killed what is generally estimated as 40,000 people. There have been similar massacres in French West Africa, in the Cameroons; and also in many places in North Africa.

As for the Army, the electric tortures they have been using in Algeria were perfected by long use in Indo-China, where it was standard practice to arrest Indo-Chinese suspected of being Communist, or anti-French, and torture them until they gave the names of any others they knew who might be so minded. Algeria is only continuing what Indo-China started: the moral corruption of an Army and, indirectly, of the society behind that Army.

JOHN C. HOLT, II
Boston, Mass.

► *Politics in California*

SIRS:

THE June 23 issue of *The New Republic* contains a reference to the McClatchy newspapers in Ronnie Dugger's article *Politics in California.* The author refers to "the Three Democratic McClatchy Bee papers." The McClatchy papers are traditionally independent and do not adhere to any one political party. Endorsement is based on an analysis of the issues involved and the candidates participating. Consequently the papers through the years have endorsed men from various political parties.

Reference is also made to "circulation about 200,000." Actually our ABC audited figure of March '58 shows 276,652.

FRANKLIN C. MCPEAK
McClatchy Newspapers
Sacramento, California

Perhaps Mr. Dugger had in mind that the Bee papers were among the few in the US to endorse Mr. Stevenson in both '52 and '56.

—THE EDITORS

► *Kennedy's Wisconsin Performance*

SIRS:

ED BAYLEY'S report on the Senator Jack Kennedy performance at Wisconsin's Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner was one of rapt if uncritical admiration—hardly befitting this hard working reporter. Many of us who read Bayley's political columns in *The Milwaukee Journal* can hardly believe that the Hidden Persuaders could take in Bayley. Here's how they worked.

Well in advance of Kennedy's arrival his two (sometimes three) advance men arrived in Milwaukee to butter up the local pros—drinks and dinners. Even prior to this, letters signed by Kennedy went out to every prominent Wisconsin Democrat saying he looked forward to meeting each one personally and to discussing critical issues, etc. During his speech and press conference no reference was given to his flip-flop positions on farm legislation, on the civil rights bill, on his effort to curry Southern support.

This to be sure is the best of Madison Avenue techniques—the best that money can buy! If it weren't for the fact that we have had glossy images built by the hucksters in the past two elections, and the American electorate is beginning to suspect that more is needed in a President than a cellophane package—this Kennedy build up would be worrisome.

HARRY L. SVENSON
Oshkosh, Wisconsin



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